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MLSMK Investment Co.: Civil RICO Liability After the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and Central Bank
Matthew P. Thomas*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, the United States Congress passed the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)' in an attempt to "er-
adicat[e]" organized crime. 2 In service of that goal, it sought to
provide "enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the un-
lawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."3 Along with
RICO's criminal penalties,4 the Act provides for considerable civil
remedies, including treble damages.5 The appeal of treble damages
caused many plaintiffs to turn ordinary civil actions into RICO
claims.6 Some courts became alarmed at the "extraordinary, if not
outrageous"' ways in which RICO was being invoked and sought to
limit its reach.8 The Supreme Court rebuffed those attempts at re-
striction.9 With a judicial fix ruled out, the legislature moved to limit
the applicability of RICO in civil cases when it passed section 107 of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) (The RICO
Amendment).10
This Comment will look at the Second Circuit's restrictive analysis
on the RICO Amendment's bar against RICO claims in MLSMK In-
vestment Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., a case stemming from Bernie
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, May 2014; B.A. Economics, Michigan
State University, June 2011; B.A. Public Policy, Michigan State University, June 2011.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (State-
ment of Findings and Purpose).
3. Id.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1963.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
6. John E. Grenier & Sally S. Reilly, Civil RICO - The Scope of Coverage After Sedima, 47
ALA. LAw. 260, 261 (1986).
7. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
8. Id. at 484.
9. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985).
10. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107 (1995) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) to provide that "no person
may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities to establish a violation of section 1962").
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Madoff's Ponzi scheme." Primarily, the court sought to determine
whether the "RICO Amendment bars all RICO claims 'that would
have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities,' or
only RICO claims in cases where that plaintiff could have asserted a
fraud claim against the named defendant."12 The Second Circuit held
that section 107 of the PSLRA precludes a plaintiff from bringing a
civil RICO claim premised upon predicate acts of securities fraud
even when the plaintiff could not bring a private securities law claim
against the same defendant.13
This Comment will argue that the rule announced in MLSMK is
correct on both legal and public policy grounds, despite what its critics
have argued.14 The Comment proceeds in three parts. Part II exam-
ines the background of civil RICO liability, from the passage of RICO
in 1970 through the passage of section 107 of the PSLRA, looking at
legislative purpose, relevant case law, and attempted changes.15 Part
III explores the Second Circuit's decision MLSMK, an article about
the case by Michael Buscher, and an article about the underlying issue
by Eliza Clark Riffe. Part III will first look at the relevant facts, the
Second Circuit's holding, and the court's reasoning in MLSMK. Then
it will look at both the Buscher and Riffe article, outlining each au-
thor's legal and policy arguments.16 Part IV analyzes the legal and
policy arguments underpinning the holding of MLSMK, arguing that
both are sound, contrary to critical treatment.'7 Part V summarily
concludes.' 8
II. BACKGROUND
A. RICO Passed as a Broad Anti-Organized Crime Measure
Congress' stated goal in passing the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, which created RICO, was the "eradication of organized
crime."1 9 During its deliberations, Congress found that, among other
things, organized crime in the United States "weaken[s] the stability
11. MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011).
12. Id. at 274 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 280.
14. Michael Buscher, Note, Civil RICO Liability - The Second Circuit's Interpretation of the
PSLRA Amendment Has Broad Implications for Victims of Securities Fraud Conspiracy, 65
SMU L. REV. 205 (2012); Eliza Clark Riffe, Comment, Actionability and Ambiguity: RICO After
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 463 (2012).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
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of the Nation's economic system, harm[s] innocent investors and com-
peting organizations, interfere[s] with free competition, . . . threaten[s]
the domestic security, and undermine[s] the general welfare of the Na-
tion and its citizens." 20 Congress further stated that organized crime
continued to grow, unabated by law enforcement, because of deficien-
cies in the evidence gathering process and a lack of effective remedies
"to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime." 21 The purpose of the law was to close those deficits. In order
to expand the remedies available to prosecutors in their fight against
organized crime, Congress added civil remedies that included treble
damages. 22 The version of the bill that originally passed the Senate
did not include the treble damages provision; the only civil remedy it
provided for was injunctive relief.2 3 However, treble damages were
included in the final bill after supporters argued that it would increase
the effectiveness of RICO's provisions by adding another avenue from
which organized crime could be attacked. 24 Despite the advantages of
the treble damage provisions, three members on the House Judiciary
Committee opposed its inclusion, based on the prescient fear that it
would be used to go after legitimate businesses, not just organized
crime.25 After clearing the committee, the bill passed both the House
of Representatives and the Senate with little trouble.26
B. After the Passage of RICO, Civil RICO Cases Became
Dominated by Cases Against Legitimate Businesses,
Sparking Concern
The opportunity for the treble damages promised by civil RICO
cases went largely unnoticed during the law's first decade. 27 In the
first eleven years of the law, there were only eighteen published opin-
ions dealing with civil RICO cases;28 in the next three years that num-
ber would increase to over one hundred.29 By the mid-1980s, as a
result of the potential for a large payday, a so-called "RICO Bar"
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486 (1985).
24. Id. at 487; see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) (explaining that civil
remedies can be effective against organized crime by being one more tool for the public to use to
"divest" the organization of its "ill-gotten gains").
25. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 487.
26. Id. at 488.
27. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
28. Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1101, 1101 n.7 (1982).
29. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 486.
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formed that "specialize[d] in bringing or defending RICO claims." 30
The "RICO Bar" usually wielded RICO claims as a tool to obtain a
settlement, lest the defendant risk being labeled as a racketeer and,
even worse, having to pay the onerous treble damages.31 Civil RICO
cases were not targeting organized crime anymore but, rather, deep-
pocketed companies like "American Express Company, E.F. Hutton
& Co., Lloyd's of London, Bear Stearns & Co., and Merrill Lynch." 32
This explosion of civil RICO cases, instead of securities fraud claims,
was likely due to the "RICO Bar" realizing that alleging a RICO vio-
lation allowed plaintiffs to not only receive treble damages instead of
actual damages, but it also allowed plaintiffs to sidestep the standing
limitations imposed on securities fraud suits. 33
In response to this apparent gaming of the system, the Second Cir-
cuit in Sedima v. Imrex Co. attempted to limit recovery of treble dam-
ages to instances when the defendant had already been criminally
convicted of either a predicate act or a RICO violation.34 Under the
Second Circuit's view, to bring a civil RICO case, the plaintiff must
first wait for a successful criminal conviction of the predicate act that
gives rise to a RICO charge. 35 The court, after noting that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) was modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act,36 reasoned
that, because the Clayton Act says: "injured . . . by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws,"37 while § 1964(c) says: "injured . .. by
reason of a violation of section 1962,"38 Congress intended to impose a
conviction requirement to § 1964(c) where none exists in section 4 of
the Clayton Act. 39
The court read the language of § 1964(c) to mean that only criminal
conduct would be punished, implying that a plaintiff would have to
prove the conduct beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.40 In order to
avoid confusion for juries wrestling with different burdens of proof for
30. Id. at 486-87.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 487.
33. Note, supra note 28, at 1115-16. In order to establish standing for a Rule lOb-5 violation,
the potential plaintiff must have been the actual purchaser or seller of the security. See Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
34. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 503.
35. Id. at 502.
36. Id. at 498 (citing G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009
(1980)); see infra Part II.C.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
39. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498.
40. Id. at 502-03.
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different claims in a civil trial, the court determined that Congress
"expected" civil RICO cases to require a prior criminal conviction.41
The Second Circuit tried to further limit recovery by imposing a
standing requirement on the plaintiff of having suffered a "racketeer-
ing injury."42 The court defined "racketeering injury" as being the
type of injury contemplated by the passage of RICO even though it
rejected a need to tie a violation to organized crime earlier in the
case.43 The court based this definition on its interpretation of the
Clayton Act as requiring an "antitrust injury." 44 On appeal, the Su-
preme Court reversed this ruling.45
The Supreme Court easily struck down the Second Circuit's convic-
tion requirement. 46 The Court first explained that the "term 'viola-
tion' does not imply a criminal conviction" under RICO. 47 The term
has been interpreted to mean "failure to adhere to legal require-
ments" in other sections of the statute rather than requiring a formal
conviction.48 Further, the only reference to a conviction requirement
in RICO's legislative history is an objection that the treble-damages
provision is too broad because there is no conviction requirement. 49
The Supreme Court also struck down the "racketeering injury" re-
quirement imposed by the Second Circuit because interpreting "rack-
eteering injury" consistently with the statutory language would make
the requirement superfluous.50 The Court reasoned that any plaintiff
who wished to recover for a RICO violation would have to show that
he was injured in his business or property by "(1) conduct (2) of an
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity."5' This
means that any recoverable injury is necessarily a "racketeering
injury." 5 2
41. Id. at 503.
42. Id. at 498.
43. Id. at 495-96 ("RICO was not enacted merely because criminals break laws, but because
mobsters . . . cause systemic harm to competition and the market, and thereby injure investors
and competitors. It was to help solve this problem that Congress added RICO to the arsenal of
weapons used to fight organized crime."); see id. at 492 (rejecting the organized crime
requirement).
44. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494-95.
45. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
46. Id. at 489-90.
47. Id. at 489.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 489-90 (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 35,342 (1970)).
50. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 494-95.
51. Id. at 496.
52. Id.
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Sedima established that RICO is to be read broadly regardless of
the consequences. 53 The Court quoted from the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, saying that Congress expressly wanted RICO to
"'be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.'" 5 4 In-
stead of sharing the Second Circuit's fear of the "extraordinary, if not
outrageous"55 application of civil RICO, the Supreme Court said that
when it passed the legislation, Congress wanted to "reach both 'legiti-
mate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises." 5 6 The Court did concede that
most private actions under RICO were being brought against legiti-
mate businesses rather than against mobsters, but said that "this de-
fect . . . is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie
with Congress."5 7
C. After Sedima, the Supreme Court Began a Move to Limit RICO
Despite the Supreme Court's proclamation in Sedima, seven years
later in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,58 the Supreme
Court imposed its own limit to civil RICO cases by applying common
law proximate cause requirements to such cases. 59 The Court based
this application of a common law proximate cause requirements on
the shared language between § 1964(c), section 4 of the Clayton Act,
and section 7 of the Sherman Act.60 Section 1964(c) states: "Any per-
son injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of sec-
tion 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damage he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fee." 61 Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act similarly states: "[A]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any [appropriate United States
district court], and shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee." 62
53. 473 U.S. at 497-98. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981).
54. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (quoting Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a) (1970)).
55. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
56. Sedima, 473 U.S at 499 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586-87).
57. Id.
58. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
59. Id. at 267-68.
60. Id. at 266-68. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143,
150-51 (1987); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987); Sedima, 473
U.S. at 489.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
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The only difference between the two statutes are the phrases "viola-
tion of section 1962"63 in § 1964(c) and "anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws" 64 in section 4 of the Clayton Act. The Court found this
difference to be nothing more than a "minor departure in wording"
with no effect on the fundamental meaning of the statutes.65 Further-
more, the relevant part of section 4 of the Clayton Act reads:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws, may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States .. . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 66
This language was "originally enacted in 1890 as [section] 7 of the
Sherman Act." 67 Courts have long read section 7 of the Sherman Act
to incorporate proximate cause.68 Based on this, the Court reasoned
that, because Congress chose to use essentially the same language as
section 7 of the Sherman Act when enacting section 4 of the Clayton
Act, it intended to adopt the established judicial interpretation of that
language, namely, that proximate cause would be required to prove
claims made under section 4 of the Clayton Act.69 The Court applied
the same logic to § 1964(c), saying that, because Congress chose to use
language from the Clayton Act, it meant to adopt the established judi-
cial interpretation of that language and, therefore, it meant to adopt a
proximate cause requirement. 70 At its most basic level, the imposition
of a common law proximate cause requirement in civil RICO cases
requires that there be a direct relationship between the injury com-
plained of and the injurious conduct alleged.71 Imposing a proximate
cause requirement makes it easier for courts to adjudicate RICO cases
because: (1) the less direct an injury is, the harder it is to calculate
damages; (2) recognizing the claims of the indirectly injured would
force courts to figure out distributional rules since there would inevi-
tably be multiple parties indirectly injured; and (3) a directly injured
party can better advocate his position, making it more likely that inju-
rious conduct is deterred.72 While a proximate cause requirement
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
65. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489 n.8; see supra Part II.B.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
67. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 530 (1983).
68. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267 (1992).
69. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal, 459 U.S. at 534.
70. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 268-70.
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makes the adjudication of these cases easier, it also limits those plain-
tiffs who can bring civil RICO claims.73
D. Central Bank Eliminates Aiding and Abetting as a Private
Cause of Action Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act
In Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,74 the Supreme Court abol-
ished one avenue for individual recovery in securities fraud cases: the
private cause of action for aiding and abetting.75 Prior to this ruling,
most courts held that plaintiffs could bring private aiding and abetting
actions under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act if they could
show: "first, that a primary violation of the Exchange Act had oc-
curred; second, that the aider and abettor had awareness or knowl-
edge of the violation and their assistance to the primary violator (the
culpability prong); and third, that the aider and abettor substantially
assisted in the primary violation." 76 The Supreme Court, however,
completely rejected the inclusion of aiding and abetting actions under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act.77 The respondents and the
SEC, in an amicus brief, argued that the phrase "directly or indi-
rectly" 78 from section 10(b) should be interpreted as the equivalent of
"aiding and abetting." 79 The Court rejected this argument because
aiding and abetting reaches beyond indirect engagement in an activity
barred by section 10(b).80 Aiding and abetting reaches people who
just give a "degree of aid to those" who engage in the section 10(b)
fraud."' The Court bolstered its legislative argument by pointing out
other instances in the Securities Exchange Act where the "direct and
indirect" language is used without any indication that it means "aiding
and abetting." 82
While the Court in Central Bank felt that the text of both the 1933
and 1934 Securities Acts was sufficient to settle the case,83 the Court
73. Id. at 268-89.
74. Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
75. Id.
76. Joseph A. Franco, Of Complicity and Compliance: A Rules-Based Anti-Complicity Strategy
Under Federal Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1, 38 (2011).
77. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 175.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . (b)
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... [J any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[SEC] may prescribe.").
79. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 175-76.
80. Id. at 176.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 177.
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felt that it needed to respond to the SEC's policy argument that it
raised in its amicus brief.8 4 The SEC claimed that a private cause of
action for aiding and abetting is an important tool in deterring "secon-
dary actors from contributing to fraudulent activities and ensures that
defrauded plaintiffs are made whole."85 The Court agreed that al-
lowing private causes of actions against aiders and abettors would un-
doubtedly expand the reach of the statute and strengthen
enforcement, but there would be disadvantages as well.86 The Court
specifically pointed to the increasing cost of litigation and the effects
of the increase in litigation.87 Increased costs are realized in higher
attorney fees from increased litigation, needless settlements for fear of
losing the case at trial, and higher entrance barriers for new, smaller
firms entering the market place.88 The Court did not engage in a nor-
mative argument over which policy side weighed heavier, choosing in-
stead to take the path of judicial restraint, leaving the balancing of
policy interests to Congress.89
E. Section 107 of the PSLRA was Passed Specifically to Bar
Securities Fraud as a Predicate Act for a Civil RICO Claim
Passed in 1995, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) was an amalgamation of amendments to pre-existing laws
designed to improve securities litigation in the United States.90 The
amendment aimed at RICO and added the phrase "except that no
person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as
fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of
section 1962"91 to the existing language of RICO. 9 2 Based on the
plain language of the statute, section 107 of the PSLRA was passed
with the express intention of barring plaintiffs from charging predicate
acts of securities fraud as the basis for a civil RICO case. 93 Prior to
the RICO Amendment, plaintiffs could, and often did,94 bring civil
RICO cases based on the predicate act of securities fraud.95 When
84. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 188.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 189.
88. Id.
89. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 188.
90. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
92. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486-88 (1985).
93. MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268, 273-74 (2d Cir. 2011).
94. See Bald Eagle Area Sch. Dist. v. Keystone Fin., Inc., 189 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006).
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Congress was debating the PSLRA, the SEC Chairman testified in
favor of section 107, saying that "because the securities laws generally
provide adequate remedies for those injured by securities fraud, it is
both unnecessary and unfair to expose defendants in securities cases
to the threat of treble damages and other extraordinary remedies pro-
vided by RICO."96 The Conference Committee Report unequivocally
states that the Committee intended for section 107 to "eliminate se-
curities fraud as a predicate offense in a civil RICO action."97 The
report goes on to say that Congress intended that "a plaintiff may not
plead other specified offenses, such as mail and wire fraud, as predi-
cate acts under civil RICO if such offenses are based on conduct that
would have been actionable as securities fraud." 98 The purpose of the
amendment was to prevent plaintiffs from turning a securities fraud
case, in which recovery is limited to actual damages, into a civil RICO
case, in which plaintiffs could receive treble damages. 99
III. SUBJEc-r OPINION
A. MLSMK Investment Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.
1. Facts
The controversy in MLSMK arose from the fallout from Bernie
Madoff's long-running Ponzi scheme. 00 Beginning in October of
2008, MLSMK invested $12.8 million with Madoff's investment-advi-
sory business, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS), los-
ing it all when Madoff was arrested and his assets were seized.101
Madoff promised the clients of his investment-advisory business re-
turns of "up to 10-12% a year," but he never made any invest-
ments.102 Instead, he used the money from new investors to pay
"returns" to older investors and to himself, "a classic Ponzi
scheme."1 03
JP Morgan Chase (JPMC) was engaged with BMIS as a trading
partner in BMIS's legitimate market-making business.104 Madoff al-
legedly deposited all the money he received from his Ponzi scheme
96. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 19 (1995).
97. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 47 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
98. Id.
99. MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268, 274 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Reply Brief of Appellant at 19, MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268 (2d
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3040-cv)).
100. Id. at 270.
101. Id. at 269.
102. Id. at 270.
103. Id.
104. MLSMK, 651 F.2d at 270.
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into accounts he had at JPMC, having an average balance of several
billion dollars, including MLSMK's investment.10 5 MLSMK alleges
that JPMC developed a derivative product "specifically for use with
Madoff-related investments" and then hedged against that risk by in-
vesting a substantial amount of money with Madoff.106 When BMIS
continued to perform strongly in the face of "market mayhem," JPMC
became suspicious and launched an internal due diligence investiga-
tion of Madoff's operations.1 0 7 By September 2008, JPMC "quietly
liquidated" its investments in Madoff's fund, having concluded that
his business was a fraud.10
2. Procedural History
MLSMK alleged that even after JPMC figured out that Madoff's
business was a scam, JPMC continued to trade with Madoff's market-
making business and continued to provide Madoff with banking ser-
vices because holding the large cash balances in Madoff's account was
too lucrative for JPMC.109 MLSMK filed suit in April 2009, alleging
that JPMC "conspired to violate RICO . . . by 'knowingly and pur-
posely conspir[ing]' with Madoff to further Madoff's racketeering en-
terprise" by providing banking services and "by engaging in various
RICO 'predicate acts,' including 'numerous interstate wire communi-
cations."' 110 In June 2009, JPMC filed a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, arguing that the RICO claim was barred by section 107 of
the PSLRA.111 The district court granted JPMC's motion to dismiss,
basing the dismissal of the RICO claim on MLSMK's failure to ade-
quately plead JPMC's requisite state of mind.112 MLSMK appealed to
the Second Circuit. 113
3. The Second Circuit's Opinion in MLSMK
JPMC said in its brief that Congress intended section 107 to bar
plaintiffs from relying on predicate acts based on securities fraud "to
avoid the 'so-called treble damages blunderbuss of RICO in securities
105. Id. at 271.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 272.
109. MLSMK, 651 F.2d at 272.
110. Id. at 272-73 (quoting Complaint 67, MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651
F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 1:09-cv-o4049)).
111. Id. at 273. See supra Part II.E (discussing section 107 of the PSLRA).
112. MLSMK, 651 F. 2d at 273.
113. Id.
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fraud cases."1 14 JPMC argued that MLSMK's claims arose solely
from allegations that JPMC helped Madoff perpetrate securities
fraud.115 MLSMK argued that the RICO Amendment barred civil
RICO claims based on securities fraud only in cases "where [the]
plaintiff could have asserted a fraud claim against the named defen-
dant."116 The Second Circuit had previously found that securities
fraud laws do not create a private cause of action for aiding and abet-
ting securities, mail, or wire fraud.117 Therefore, MLSMK argued that
it could not "[assert] a fraud claim against the named defendant" and
the RICO Amendment did not apply.""
The court looked at the district split that existed in the Second Cir-
cuit.119 In both Fezzani v. Bear Stearns & Co.120 and Thomas H. Lee
Equity Fund v. Mayer Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP,121 the plaintiffs al-
leged that "a defendant violated RICO by aiding and abetting an-
other's securities law violations." 122 The court in both of these cases
followed similar logic, stating that courts cannot keep a loophole open
to allow plaintiffs to bring a civil RICO suit so long as they were "pur-
suing aiders and abettors"123 simply because their aiding and abetting
claims were not actionable.124 Doing so would negate the protection
given to potential defendants by the RICO Amendment. The court in
Thomas H. Lee found that the correct interpretation of the RICO
Amendment, therefore, is that it "bars claims based on conduct that
could be actionable under the securities laws even when the plaintiff,
himself, cannot bring a cause of action under the securities laws."125
On the flip side, in OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe International
Inc.,126 relied on by MLSMK, the plaintiffs again alleged a RICO
claim based on aiding and abetting of another's securities law viola-
tions; however, the court held that the RICO Amendment bars only
114. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 17, MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651
F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3040-cv) (quoting Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No.
99CIV0793RCC, 2005 WL 500377, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2005)).
115. Id. at 18.
116. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 274.
117. Fezzani, 2005 WL 500377, at *4.
118. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 274.
119. Id.
120. Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 99CIV0793RCC, 2005 WL 500377 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.2,
2005).
121. Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund v. Mayer Brown, Rowe & Maw L.L.P., 612 F. Supp. 2d 267
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
122. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 275 (citing Thomas H. Lee, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 281).
123. Thomas H. Lee, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
124. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 275.
125. Thomas H. Lee, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
126. OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Int'l, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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RICO "claims based on predicate acts of securities fraud that the
plaintiffs could have pursued . . . against the named defendant." 127
The court said that the only question was whether "the [named defen-
dant's] alleged conduct is actionable under those laws." 128 Since the
plaintiff's claims against the defendant were not actionable under fed-
eral securities laws, the RICO Amendment did not bar them. 129 A
district court reached a similar decision in Renner v. Chase Manhattan
Bank,130 in which the court allowed a RICO claim against a bank
whose allegations did not provide a "valid basis for a securities fraud
claim" because the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant only aided and
abetted the fraud of a third party.13' As a result, there was no actiona-
ble securities fraud claim against the bank and the court held that sec-
tion 107 of the PSLRA did not apply.132 The Second Circuit felt that
OSRecovery failed to consider the Fezzani and Thomas H. Lee courts'
interpretation of the statute that a civil RICO claim's viability does
not depend on the plaintiff's ability to bring a securities claim against
the named defendant; rather, a civil RICO claim's viability depends
on the nature of the predicate act itself.133
The Second Circuit held that the RICO Amendment bars civil
RICO claims "alleging predicate acts of securities fraud, even where a
plaintiff cannot itself pursue a securities fraud action against the de-
fendant."134 The court found the plain language of the bill to be per-
suasively clear. 35 The Amendment is worded broadly and "when
Congress stated that 'no person' could bring a civil RICO action alleg-
ing conduct that would have been actionable as securities fraud," it
"did not mean 'no person except one who has no other actionable
securities fraud claim."1 36 The court found no evidence that Con-
gress wanted the Amendment to be read in the "limited manner that
MLSMK urge[d]." The court noted that Congress offered additional
avenues for recovery in securities fraud actions when it wanted to do
so; therefore, because there is no express language in the RICO
Amendment carving out MLSMK's desired loophole, the court con-
127. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 276.
128. OSRecovery, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
129. Id. at 371.
130. Renner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 98 Civ. 926 (CSH), 1999 WL 47239 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 3, 1999).
131. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 277 (quoting Renner, 1999 WL 47239, at *6).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 279.
134. Id. at 277.
135. Id. at 278.
136. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 278 (quoting Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Asenio, No.
CIV.A.98-5204, 1999 WL 144109, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1999)).
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cluded that Congress did not intend to preserve a similar avenue for
recovery in civil RICO actions.137 The court found that the legislative
history of the PSLRA bolstered its interpretation of the RICO
amendment.138 The Conference Committee report states that the pur-
pose was to "remove [as a predicate act of racketeering] any conduct
that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities as racketeering activity under civil RICO."139 The Senate
Report also suggests that Congress was satisfied that securities laws
''generally provide adequate remedies for those injured by securities
fraud." 140
The Second Circuit further bolstered its decision by noting that
there are similarly decided cases in other federal circuits.141 The court
noted that in those cases, like here, federal courts barred the plaintiffs'
RICO claims based on the RICO Amendment despite the fact that
plaintiffs were left with no recourse for private recovery under securi-
ties law.142
B. Buscher Article
In his Comment, Michael Buscher took issue with the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in MLSMK.143 Buscher starts out by acknowledging
that the Second Circuit's decision follows the larger judicial trend of
narrowing the scope of the RICO Amendment, which started in 1992
with the Holmes decision.144 However, he goes on to critique the
opinion on both legal and policy grounds, arguing that the court over-
stated its case, thereby leaving potentially innocent victims out in the
cold without a path to private recovery even when they are legiti-
mately harmed, while encouraging actors like JPMC to turn a blind
eye to securities fraud and reap the benefits.145
Buscher first claims that the court overstated the lack of ambiguity
in the statute's wording. 146 He used the decisions in OSRecovery and
Renner as evidence that the Second Circuit overlooked the ambiguity
137. Id. (citing Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 279 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 47 (1995) (Conf. Rep.)).
140. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 104-98, at 19 (1995)).
141. MLSMK, 651 F.3d. at 280 (citing Affco Invs. 2001 L.L.C. v. Proskauer Rose L.L.P., 625
F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2010); Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751 (10th Cir. 2010); Howard v. Am. Online,
Inc., 208 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2000); Bald Eagle Area Sch. Dist. v. Keystone Fin., Inc., 189 F.3d 321
(3d Cir. 1999)).
142. Id. at 280.
143. Buscher, supra note 14.
144. Id. at 208-09.
145. Id. at 211.
146. Id. at 209.
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created by the word "actionable" in the statute.147 Section 107 of the
PSLRA amended § 1964(c) of RICO to read, "no person may rely
upon conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the
purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section
1962."148 Both cases used similar logic, stating that, because aiding
and abetting securities fraud is not actionable under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, per the decision in Central Bank, such action does
not fall under the umbrella of section 107 of the PSLRA.149 Buscher
furthers his argument, saying that it is this interpretation of the
breadth of section 107, not the interpretation adopted by the Second
Circuit, that is the most obvious.o50
Buscher then claims that the Second Circuit overstated the clarity in
the PSLRA's legislative history.'5 He claims that the court "clearly
ignored the general theme underlying the amendment: to deter and
bar meritless claims."152 He quotes from the Senate Report of the
PSLRA saying that it "aims 'to encourage plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue
valid claims"' and that it was "expected to continue 'to provide the
highest level of protection to investors in our capital markets."" 53
Buscher says that an investor, like MLSMK, should be afforded the
"highest level of protection" in the way that the Senate Report indi-
cated was intended by the PSLRA.154 Further, Buscher says that, far
from being a meritless claim (of the kind the PSLRA was designed to
stop), "[i]t is clear that MLSMK's claim against JPMC was meritori-
ous."s55 JPMC conducted an investigation into BMIS's suspiciously
successful business, discovered-or was skeptical enough to pull out
its own investments-the Ponzi scheme, but continued to let others be
schemed out of their investments, all while continuing to profit off of
the scheme.156 Buscher admits that the passage of legislative history
that the Second Circuit relied on specifically bars securities related
conduct from being a predicate act for a RICO case.'57 However,
147. Id. (citing OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Int'l, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368-70
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Renner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 98 Civ. 926 (CSH), 1999 WL 47239, at
*7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1999)).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
149. OSRecovery, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d at 368-70; Renner, 1999 WL 47239, at *7-9.
150. Buscher, supra note 14, at 209.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 210.
153. Id. at 209 (quoting S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995)).
154. Id.
155. Buscher, supra note 14, at 210.
156. Id.
157. Id. ("The Committee intends this amendment to eliminate securities fraud as a predicate
act of racketeering in a civil RICO action." S. REP. No. 104-98, at 19 (1995)).
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Buscher feels that the court focused on this passage to the exclusion of
the larger stated aims of the amendment: deterring meritless claims
and protecting investors. 58 Buscher implies that it was a desire to
follow the judicial trend of narrowing RICO that drove the Second
Circuit's decision rather than the clearest interpretation of the statute
and its legislative history.159
Buscher also raises significant objections to the Second Circuit's
opinion on policy grounds. With the advent of the Central Bank rul-
ing that there could be no private actions brought under section 10 of
the Securities Act for merely aiding and abetting securities fraud, vic-
tims of such fraud had to turn to RICO as a last chance at recovery.160
With the passage of the PSLRA, and its interpretation in the MLSMK
case, many victims are left "without valid recourse against those prof-
iting from fraudulent securities conspiracy." 16 1 One of the goals of the
PSLRA, as recognized by the Second Circuit, was to prevent "boot-
strapping" security fraud claims into RICO claims with the possibility
of treble damages.162 However, in MLSMK, there was no securities
claim to "boot-strap" up from, and, without the possibility for a RICO
claim because of the PSLRA, there was no recovery at all.163
Buscher's policy critique tracks closely with that of dissenting Sena-
tors from the passage of the PSLRA. Buscher admits that reducing
meritless claims is important, but he goes on to contend that doing so
comes with several problems.164 He quotes Senator Chris Dodd say-
ing that "we must do all that we can to ensure that legitimate victims
can continue to sue and can recover damages quickly." 165 Buscher's
critique, in essence, says that the statute, combined with the judicial
precedent of Central Bank and MLSMK, over-solves the issue of re-
ducing meritless RICO claims.166 In the haste to get rid of meritless
claims, the legal system has taken away legitimate victims' ability to
recover their losses from fraudulent activity.
Buscher also takes issue with the incentives that the MLSMK deci-
sion creates. Without an avenue for private recovery, JPMC would
now be incentivized to continue to "reap the benefits of other's fraud-
ulent investment activities" at the expense of "innocent investors"
158. Id.
159. Id. at 209.
160. Buscher, supra note 14, at 209.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 210.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Buscher, supra note 14, at 211.
166. Id.
CIVIL RICO LIABILITY
such as MLSMK.167 Buscher seems to favor the plan of three dissent-
ing Senators (Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer) to include in the PSLRA a
legislative override to the Central Bank decision in order to allow aid-
ing and abetting security fraud to be actionable. 168 While this would
not allow plaintiffs to receive the treble damages that a RICO claim
would allow, it would give plaintiffs an avenue for compensatory
damages. 169
C. Riffe Article
In her Comment, Eliza Riffe examines federal circuit courts' inter-
pretations of the RICO Amendment, the legislative history of the
PSLRA, and policy arguments that support her position.170 She advo-
cates for what she calls a "narrow" interpretation of the RICO
Amendment, arguing that the amendment should be read to allow
cases in which the specific claim would not have been actionable
under securities laws.171 Riffe contrasts this approach with the "abso-
lute preclusion" model exemplified by the Second Circuit's decision in
MLSMK.172 She argues for a narrow interpretation of the RICO
Amendment because a narrow interpretation is more consistent with
the amendment's legislative history and is supported by several policy
reasons.'73
Riffe first argues that there is a circuit split regarding the interpreta-
tion of the RICO Amendment, or, at the very least, the issue remains
unsettled. 174 She says that the Second (in MLSMK), Third, and Ninth
Circuits use a broad interpretation by utilizing the "absolute preclu-
sion" model, while the Fifth and Tenth Circuits use a the narrow inter-
pretation by utilizing the "actionability analysis."175 Riffe's basis for
asserting that there is a circuit split is the Affco Investments v. Pros-
kauer Rose case in the Fifth Circuit and the Bixler v. Fowler case in
the Tenth Circuit. 76 In both cases, the courts turned to the common
law that has emerged around securities laws. In Affco, the court
looked to the Howey test to determine if the interests in question con-
167. Id.
168. Id. at 210.
169. Id.
170. Riffe, supra note 14, at 465.
171. Id. at 485.
172. Id. at 476.
173. Id. at 485-89.
174. Id. at 471.
175. Riffe, supra note 14, at 472-73.
176. Id. at 481-82; see Affco Invs. 2001 L.L.C. v. Proskauer Rose L.L.P., 625 F.3d 185 (5th Cir.
2010); see also Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751 (10th Cir. 2010).
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stituted an "investment contract" and if they consequently fell under
the auspices of securities fraud.177 In Bixler, the court examined
whether or not the relevant transaction established a "purchase or
sale" for the purpose of securities laws.17s Riffe contends that the ap-
proaches used in both of these cases are sufficiently different than
those used in "absolute preclusion" circuits like the Second Circuit.179
The essence of the difference between these two approaches is that in
the "absolute preclusion" circuits courts look to the pleadings for any-
thing that "looks and smells like securities fraud," while the "action-
ability analysis" circuits "test the claim's viability under various legal
theories to see if it is, in fact, actionable under existing securities
laws."180
When examining the legislative history of the PSLRA, Riffe relies
on two main arguments.18' First, she points out that section 108 of the
PSLRA includes a "savings clause" which says that "'the amendments
made by this title shall not affect or apply to any private action arising
under title I of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or title I of the
Securities Act of 1933,' currently pending." 182 Riffe contends that the
specific enumeration of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Securities Act of 1933 indicates a narrow meaning of the RICO
Amendment: the amendment should apply only to those situations
that are actionable under those two statutes. 83 Second, Riffe exam-
ines the path that the language of the RICO Amendment took, begin-
ning with the language that was proposed in the Senate to the final
language that was passed into law. The proposed language from the
Senate read: "no person may bring an action under this provision if
the racketeering activity . . . involves fraud in the sale of securities,"
while the final language reads: "would have been actionable."1 8 4 Riffe
asserts that the narrowing of this language from "involves" to "would
have been actionable" indicates that Congress wanted a narrow inter-
pretation of the RICO Amendment. 85
In her policy argument, Riffe uses error analysis to argue that a
narrow interpretation of the RICO Amendment will lead to lower er-
177. Riffe, supra note 14, at 481-82. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99
(1946) for the full test.
178. Riffe, supra note 14, at 483.
179. Id. at 481.
180. Id. at 472.
181. Id. at 486.
182. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 108 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006)).
183. Riffe, supra note 14, at 486.
184. Id. at 488.
185. Id.
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ror costs than a broader interpretation.186 First, she argues that the
narrow interpretation is consistent with the "rule of lenity," a common
canon of statutory construction.8 7 The rule of lenity directs courts to
choose the more narrow interpretation of a statute when there are two
possible interpretations of an ambiguous passage and one interpreta-
tion is harsher than the other.188 Second, she contends that the proper
enforcement of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will
guard against undermining the goal of reducing meritless litigation of
the PSLRA.189 Rule 9(b) says that, when asserting fraud, the litigants
must plead it with specificity.190 Riffe argues that proper enforcement
of this rule will ensure that plaintiffs have no other recourse than se-
curities fraud under RICO.191
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Arguments Against the Second Circuit are Unpersuasive
As indicated in Buscher's article,192 the legal case against the Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion in MLSMK is weak. Bringing a RICO suit
based on aiding and abetting securities fraud is barred on the face of
the relevant amendment.193 The relevant language states, "no person
may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud
in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section
1962."194 The best argument against this clear statutory bar is found
in the courts' reasoning in OSRecovery and Renner. Because Central
Bank bars aiding and abetting from being "actionable as [securities]
fraud," section 107 of the PSLRA cannot apply because the case is not
"actionable as [securities] fraud."195 This line of reasoning is a seduc-
tive attempt to get around the harsh language of the statute. Contrary
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Riffe, supra note 14, at 488.
189. Id. at 489.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Buscher, supra note 14, at 211 ("[Wlhile the language of the statute itself was not at all as
unambigious as the Second Circuit made it seem, the specific provisions found within the legisla-
tive history of the act are supportive of the court's conclusion. Additionally, the court's decision
is supported by the general trend in narrowing the civil scope of the RICO statute.").
193. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
194. Id.
195. OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Int'l Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Renner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 98 Civ. 926 (CSH), 1999 WL 47239, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 3, 1999).
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to Buscher,196 the Second Circuit did engage with, and ultimately dis-
miss, this argument.197 In quoting another court, the Second Circuit
said that Congress "did not specify that the conduct had to be actiona-
ble as securities fraud by a particular person to serve as a bar to a
RICO claim by that same person."198
The Second Circuit went further, quoting another case that said that
the plain language of section 107 of the PSLRA "does not require that
the same plaintiff who sues under RICO must be the one who can sue
under securities law."199 Extrapolating that reasoning to this case, the
predicate act of Madoff's security fraud is what bars MLSMK from
bringing the RICO claim. Madoff's fraud is the dominant act, serving
as the predicate act for both the aiding and abetting charge against
JPMC and the racketeering charge. Any damage suffered here neces-
sarily stems from the predicate act of BMIS's security fraud, and that
cannot be used to establish an 18 U.S.C. § 1962 RICO charge against
any party according to the PSLRA.200 Riffe's preferred method of
analysis, the so-called "actionability analysis," does not necessarily
foreclose this reading of the statute. Riffe wants the courts to search
for actual securities fraud under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934;201 here, Madoff's security fraud
clearly falls under the auspices of the Securities Acts.
Buscher concedes that the legislative history of the PSLRA "unam-
biguously bars plaintiffs from making civil RICO claims predicated on
securities fraud."202 In the relevant committee report, it states that
Congress' intent was "to eliminate securities fraud as a predicate act
of racketeering in a civil RICO action." 203 Buscher attempts to claim
that, despite the "unambiguous" bar, focusing on that bar does not
specifically allow a court to take into account the "general theme un-
derlying the amendment" of deterring meritless RICO claims.204
Even if the court did not take the general theme into account, the
196. Buscher, supra note 14, at 209 ("[B]ecause at least two district courts had relied on the
term actionable in determining that an aiding and abetting securities fraud claim escaped the
RICO amendment, the language at issue obviously is not as plainly 'unambigious' as the court
found.").
197. MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268, 277-78 (2d Cir. 2011).
198. Id. at 278 (quoting Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Asenio, No. CIV.A.98-5204, 1999 WL
144109, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1999)).
199. Id. (quoting Tittle v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.),
284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2003)).
200. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
201. Riffe, supra note 14, at 485-86.
202. Buscher, supra note 14, at 209.
203. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 47 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
204. Buscher, supra note 14, at 209-10.
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opinion and the legislative history clearly indicate that the Court and
Congress did consider the effects of the RICO Amendment on inno-
cent investors.205 The Second Circuit says that it is "clear from the
Senate Report that Congress was aware that the RICO Amendment
would place some claims . . . outside the reach of private civil RICO
suits. "206
Riffe utilizes a more subtle take on the legislative history, focusing
on the PSLRA's path of enactment and the narrowing of the statutory
language from its proposed version to the final version. Riffe's ap-
proach, however, mischaracterizes the nature of the PSLRA's final
language. While the PSLRA's language may have been narrowed
from the version originally passed in the Senate, the final language
retains a broadly worded clause, barring "any conduct that would have
been actionable" under securities laws. 207 The breadth of the phrase
"any conduct" supports a preclusive reading of the RICO
Amendment.
That Buscher was able to cite Senators Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer
from the record, saying that they wished to overturn Central Bank and
allow private recovery for aiding and abetting securities fraud, shows
that Congress considered overturning Central Bank and allowing pri-
vate recovery for aiding and abetting securities fraud during the legis-
lative process and chose not to do so. 208 In fact, the Senate Report
quoted in the MLSMK opinion states that, "[t]he Committee believes
that amending the 1934 [Securities Exchange] Act to provide explic-
itly for a private aiding and abetting liability actions under Section
10(b) would be contrary to [the RICO Amendment's] goal of reduc-
ing meritless securities litigation." 209 Buscher's argument that the
RICO Amendment's legislative history shows that Congress did not
consider that the amendment would leave some potential plaintiffs
out in the cold with no avenue for recovery is simply incorrect.
B. The Policy Arguments
The policy arguments articulated in Buscher's article against the
MLSMK decision also fail under scrutiny. Buscher's primary policy
argument against the MLSMK decision is that the decision failed to
protect innocent investors.210 This argument is based on Senator
205. MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268, 279 (2d Cir. 2011).
206. Id.
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
208. Buscher, supra note 14, at 210.
209. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 279 (quoting S. REP. No. 104-98, at 19 (1995)).
210. Buscher, supra note 14, at 210.
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Dodd's quote: "[W]e must do all that we can to ensure that legitimate
victims can continue to sue and can recover damages quickly." 211 This
is a noble principle to follow; however, Buscher's application of this
principle to the MLSMK case is misguided. He argues that MLSMK
was a legitimate victim and JPMC benefited from BMIS's illegal activ-
ity; therefore, JPMC must be held liable.212 While it is true that
MLSMK is a legitimate victim of fraud, it is a victim of Bernie Madoff
and BMIS, not JPMC. Although Madoff is beyond the reach of
RICO damages, which he should be liable for, this does not mean that
MLSMK is entitled to damages from anyone else connected to the
fraud.
One of the reasons Central Bank did not allow private recovery for
aiding and abetting securities fraud, as articulated by the Fezzani
court, is that a "plaintiff could deliberately plead facts that established
no more than that a particular defendant aided and abetted another's
securities fraud. Such incentive is particularly strong where . . . a
plaintiff might rely on the securities fraud of those with few assets to
obtain treble damages against deeper pockets." 213 Allowing recovery
for aiding and abetting casts too wide a net for potential defendants,
allowing the plaintiff to seek out any deep pocket that could conceiva-
bly be connected to the fraud. The leverage given to plaintiffs by the
treble damages provision in RICO, coupled with the lowered standing
barrier, could lead to an increase in coercive lawsuits aimed at a lever-
aged settlement rather than full litigation.
Buscher also argues that by not allowing a private right of action for
aiding and abetting by overturning Central Bank, the Second Circuit
created perverse incentives for actors like JPMC to continue to turn a
blind eye and profit off of fraudulent behavior while innocent inves-
tors like MLSMK get bilked.214 While it is true that there is greater
incentive for JPMC to act in such a manner without the private right
to recovery than there would be if Central Bank were overturned, this
does not mean that there are no deterrents against JPMC from contin-
uing to act in that manner. As the Second Circuit pointed out in
MLSMK, Congress considered the lack of deterrents created by Cen-
tral Bank and, to fix this, Congress explicitly "grant[ed] the SEC ex-
press authority to bring actions seeking injunctive relief or money
damages against persons who knowingly aid and abet primary viola-
211. Id. at 211 (quoting S. REP. No. 104-98, at 51).
212. Id. at 210.
213. Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 99CIV0793RCC, 2005 WL 500377, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 2, 2005).
214. Buscher, supra note 14, at 211.
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tors of the securities laws."215 The Senate Report clearly indicates
that the Senate was "satisfied that the securities laws 'generally pro-
vide adequate remedies for those injured by securities fraud." 216 Al-
though there is no private cause of action deterring fraudulent
behavior, this does not mean that a properly executed public cause of
action cannot be an effective deterrent.
Riffe's policy concerns closely track Buscher's policy concerns.
Riffe is uneasy about the possibility of a "small but important class of
cases at the margins that would be filtered out" without a narrow in-
terpretation of the RICO Amendment.217 She frames her concern as
error cost allocation, arguing that the costs of mistakenly dismissing or
allowing a case to proceed are more onerous on potential plaintiffs
rather than mistaken defendants.218
As the court in Central Bank articulated, "[p]olicy considerations
cannot override our interpretation of the text and structure of the Act,
except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to the
text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress
could not have intended it."219 While Buscher and Riffe's policy con-
cerns are certainly arguable, it is hard to imagine them ever overriding
the clear evidence that Congress intended for the result in MLSMK.
Certainly, Riffe and Buchser's concerns do not rise to the level of such
a "bizarre" result that "Congress could not have intended it."220 The
legislative history shows that Congress specifically considered and re-
jected allowing aiders and abettors a private right of action, 221 it in-
creased the public cause of action, 222 and was content with this
outcome.223
V. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision in MLSMK, in which the court re-
jected the plaintiff's civil RICO claim on the basis that section 107 of
the PSLRA barred civil RICO claims based on predicate acts that
could be actionable as securities fraud, was correctly decided on both
legal and policy grounds. The plaintiff argued that the predicate act
215. MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268, 279 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting S.
REP. No. 104-98, at 19 (1995)).
216. Id.
217. Riffe, supra note 14, at 489.
218. Id.
219. Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994).
220. Id.
221. Riffe, supra note 14, at 486.
222. Id. at 489.
223. Id.
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that served as the basis of its RICO claim-aiding and abetting securi-
ties fraud-was not covered by the PSLRA because the Central Bank
decision had rendered aiding and abetting not actionable as securities
fraud.224 Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that it was exempt from
the PSLRA because, without a civil RICO claim, it would have no
other avenue for recovery for its very real loss. 225 The Second Circuit
correctly found neither argument persuasive. The text, legal prece-
dent, and legislative history of the PSLRA all indicate that the plain-
tiff's claim was based on a predicate act-the underlying Ponzi
scheme-that was actionable as securities fraud and that Congress
had considered leaving injured plaintiffs out in the cold with no ave-
nue for recovery and decided the benefits of the legislation as drafted
outweighed the costs.
224. See MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011).
225. Id.
